History of Nationalism in Israel

History of body policy-makingism in IsraelPromised unload, reformer State The Rise, Fall and Return of the pact NationA oratory submitted by 58126 to the Depgraphicsment of Government, the London School of Economics and Political Science, in part completion of the requirements for the MSc in Comparative Politics (Conflict Studies) kinsfolk 1st, 2008Word CountABSTRACTSev agel prominent comparativists claim that Israel is an reveallier baptistery a unique look rent that generally defies virtually pompous forms of categorization. Such an allegation naturally assumes Israel to be exceptional and its look inexplicable. The laying claim of Israels uniqueness was born(p) during the marked epistemological shift from behavioural cross matter inquiries to to a great extent contextually and diachronicly- deignd theories, and has undermined Israels place in comparative politics. This dissertation seeks to place Israel and its commission squ arly back into the mix and up agai nst much of the corresponding examen faced by opposite demesne-states. By shifting again from a contextually and historically-derived conjecture of patriotism to contendf atomic number 18ds a to a greater extent cognitive and custom- found approach, touch on on the ethno-symbolic approach professed by Anthony D. Smith and John Hutchinson, elements of Israels countryalism and internal identity element ar analyzed as contributing to its hold upence as a z unmatchable of conflict and to its wild behavior. An analysis of the Covenant Nation as a new comparative house that presupposes the idea of (i) a elect people, in (ii) a Promised Land, that uses (iii) blood sacrifice in clubhouse to fulfill a redemptive serving and a commitment to materialistic salvation, is highlighted. Limited comparisons to early(a) pact estates are drawn where applicable.IntroductionSince 1948, Israel has been regarded by some as an occupying force in the Middle East. That Israel, and Jews in general, could be a subjection and occupying people given their fate in the number 1 half of the twentieth century as a nation without a home, victims of anti-Semitism and persecution is confusing to galore(postnominal). For reasons such as this, Israel has long been considered an outlier movement by semipolitical scientists (Barnett 1996, ch.1). To the point of emphasis, it is repugnd that Israel defies near categorization, which has become the methodology employed by comparativists in order to understand states and state behavior. Categorizing usually requires screen outifying a case study under dichotic, or opposite, adjectives Israel creation neither East nor West, developed nor underdeveloped, capitalist nor state-controlled, Third World nor First World therefore, becomes difficult to study (Barnett 1996, 7). Further more(prenominal) than, Israel has routinely been excluded from geographically specific studies or regional studies, since it is often considered an unk immediatelyn quantity entity in the Middle East. However, despite Israels historical particularity, Israel is non an noncitizen entity in the Middle East and its behavior is not inexplicable. While dissimilaritys sure as shooting exist categorically amidst Israel and other states, they both nevertheless share some of the same traits and concerns characteristics that index pass water similar origins.It get out be argued that in order to understand Israel, both as a nation-state and as it be chooses, one needs to understand Israeli superpatriotic sentiments. Nationalism in itself is a difficult thing to define. Where does it come from? What does it entail? How deeply is it entrenched? The answers to these questions, and m either like them, could explain why a nation-state behaves in the way that it does. there are 2 major competing schools of thought when it comes to understanding patriotism, (a) the modernists, and (b) the primordialists. The modernists would da te internalism to in spreadrialism, the in composition of capitalism, or to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The primordialists, on the other hand, see subject areaism as dating back much further possibly to so far out front history was recorded. Under this train of thought, Israel magnate date its nationalism back to the Hebrew give-and-take. Essentially, it all depends on where in history one chooses to draw the line.This paper allow for primarily argue that in order to understand Israel as an inherently violent and conflict-laden nation-state it is necessary to move away from the established contextually-derived theories of nationalism and move to one that is more cognitively base. In so doing, this paper forget show that Israel is in event a state like all others. It is not an anomaly, nor methodologically suspect its behavior not inexplicable. Regardless of its antique historic roots, and despite its recent induction as a state among the family of nations, Israels nationalism should not be analyzed according to the dates of its borders, citizens, infrastructure, or institutions. In a more cognitive approach, Israels nationalism should be mute by the borders, thoughts and people themselves. As such, it allow be shown that Israel is the archetypical Covenant Nation a category that exists free from both time and space. Such a theory of nationalism faecal matter thus draw on elements from either modern or pre-modern periods/approaches and need not be base on regional developments or similarities.Israel, like all powder compact nations, is inherently conflict-laden. As will be laid out in much greater detail, concordat nations have a strategical purification born of three identifying features/beliefs that make them violent and militaristic in nature. Covenant nations are under a patently contractual obligation to defend and secure the idea of (i) a elect people, in (ii) a Promised Land, using (iii) blood sacrifice. When the pact nation theory is highlighted as the root cause of violence, it becomes shed light on that a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict becomes much more difficult to ascertain. Conflict becomes uncor associate to geopolitical realities or alive/imagined security dilemmas, but to an embedded perceive of national superiority, a contractual obligation to fulfill the prophecy of the covenant and, derivatively, a commitment to worldly salvation.Thus, while m all scholars claim Israel is an outlier case like no other, they are wrong from the outset by attempt to assign Israel to conventional and contextual comparativist categories. Israel and its behavior roll in the hay and should be understood much the same as other states as reactive to its nationalist sentiments, wherever derived. As will be shown, Israel has al slipway been a conquering and occupying nation. It was veritable of Israels ancient past, it is true of its present and unless a drastic miscellany occur s deep within the embedded (and tabu) structure of Zionism, it will be true of its distant future.The Nation General Definitions and TheoriesQuest ce-quune nation? Renans question salvage echoes after more than a century. In recent decades through with(predicate)out the historical milieu referred to as the post-colonial era a copious amount of relate and attention has been dedicated to the study of nationalism. While no singular description is agreed on by scholars, for the purpose of this paper a nation will be delimitate generally as a convention that defines itself or is defined by others as sharing green seam and subtlety that excessively has political consciousness, claiming collective political rights in a given territory (Mann 2005, 11). A nation-state can thus be defined as an entity wherein a nation has its own sovereign state, situated within enunciated and politically defined territorial borders be they universally recognized or not.Scholars of various di sciplines have attempted to provide an ex fancyation for the tog up, meaning and development of nationalism in human history and societies. The phenomenon of the constitution of nations and national identities, the exit of national sentiments, the construction of nationhood and nationalist ideologies, appear to all be relate constituents of a single phenomenon. Nevertheless, competing theories of nationalism exist the major schism existing between modernists and primordialists.Modernists, such as Gellner and Anderson, assume that the origins of nations and nationalism lie in the structural changes that affected economic and social administrations during the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth century (Gellner 2006, 48-49), implicitly denying cultural factors. In the panorama of the modernists, the introduction of new substance of production and the division of labor caused a restructuring of social relations and the polarization of class interests. Nationalism emerged as a means to promote and direct change through the creation of a popular solidarity as well as a means to comfort and promote class interests (Anderson 1991, 113-114). The prevalence of one intention over another(prenominal) brings about the constitution of different political organizations depending on the nature the political system. So to speak, nationalism is identified by the modernists with the affect of nation-building a nation beingness a mere artificial construction fuelled by class interests.The primordialist notion of nationalism contrasts with that proposed by the modernists. Scholars such as Hastings, Smith and Geertz, call back that nations are natural givens (Hastings 1997, 5). Consequently, it is possible to find traces of nationalism and nationhood in ancient generation. The feeling of belong, the acknowledgement among a throng of people sharing common cultural, racial, linguistic traits, a common ancestry, history or righteousness, is a documente d fact in history (Smith 1994, 40). Groups tended to bind together by these ties. The aptness to coalesce around these shared traits, or focal points, brought about the rise of politically and socially organized nations claiming sovereignty over a territory.In fact, it is Anthony D. Smiths many contributions to the theory of ethnosymbolism in particular that figure most conspicuously in a discussion of Israeli nationalism, and upon which I have based my initial observations and thesis. Ethnosymbolism is founded on the historical origins of nations particularly to their roots in premodern times and focuses its attention on perceptions, beliefs, symbols, rituals, and shared myths and memories. Although the ethnosymbolic approach focuses on subjective cultural and symbolic rudiments, their long end point patterning produces a structure of relations and unconscious processes which can provide a framework for the socialization of successive generations of ethnic and national member s (Smith 1999, 14). In more basic disgracemarks, the origin and descent of the comm accordance are recollected and transmitted to new members of the group by memory as construe by earlier generations. This subjective version of a nations origins is understood through ethnohistory rather than any official historians lens (Coughlan 2001, 160).Before turning to the difference between history and historical traditions on Israeli national identity and behavior in the following section, allow me to beginning part shipway with Anthony D. Smith and highlight our major difference. In contend and Ethnicity the Role of warfare in the Formation, Self-Images and Cohesion of Ethnic Identities, Smith argues in sum that war has been a powerful factor in constitution certain of the essence(p) aspects of ethnic communities and nationhood. He points to Georg Simmels cohesion thesis, which asserts that external armed conflict or the imminent nemesis thereof produces all internal group solida rity (Smith 1981, XX). In so doing, Smith turns war and its variations into an independent shifting that moulds the ethnic community, and eer the nation. Though I do agree that war and conflict certainly have the ability to accentuate and exacerbate group identity and cohesion, I contend to the contrary that group cohesion is the primary cause of war and conflict. As such, war is the dependent variable that finds its existence and explanation in the more common group aggression theory. Thus, it is not war that creates a hotshot of belonging and community, but a sense of community and belonging that twists to war and conflict and the sense of belonging and community within the Covenant Nation typifies that.The Rise of the Nation-State Context vs. CognitionTo suggest that Israel is in fact an inherently violent nation-state on sexual conquest of the Covenant, it is necessary to first fritter the myth that all nation-states are violent, and to trace Israels legacy back beyond i ts governing. A long-standing assumption among several prominent political theorists suggests that all nation-states are inherently violent because they are regretful in warfare. Richard Bean, in War and the Nation State, argues that beginning in the fourteenth century changes in the art of war inextricably led to the rise of keyized states for the purpose of superlative taxes (Bean 1973, 220). It is possible, however, that the nation-state by general concept, if not by definition predates medieval changes in the art of war, and certainly Westphalia. Greek city-states, like Sparta, can be seen as examples of very homogeneous societies with developed political structures, taxation, and mutual obligations between brass and citizens. Regardless, ancient historical cases such as these would likely sole(prenominal) dish out to highlight the have-to doe withage between warfare and the birth of the nation-state. On the other end of the spectrum, what can be express about nation- states that have emerged contemporarily? taking Israel as an example, a state that came into being by means of a vote in the United Nations, it is easy to suggest that the Arab-Israeli wars following its establishment have played a prominent role in the shaping of modern-day Israel. However, shaping by definition is not synonymous with forging.In the first instance, it is my intention to show that nation-states are not forged explicitly in warfare, but on traditions of warfare wherever derived. The purpose is to retell the hypothesis that nation-states are forged in warfare into one more universally applicable. For this, it is necessary to first presume that the nation, with its sense of community and belonging, existed prior. It will be shown that from (i) a nations strategic husbandry, come (ii) traditions of warfare, which (iii) lead to a greater sense of national identity, on which (iv) nation-states have been forged. In so doing, I move the discourse away from a contextuall y derived theory of nationalism to a more cognitive-based approach, in which Anthony D. Smiths contributions to ethnosymbolism (as outlined in a higher place) figure prominently.A nation-states strategic culture is the obvious place to look for evidence of a war-born society. strategical culture is defined by Alistair Iain Johnston as an ideational milieu which limits behavior choices. This milieu consists of shared assumption and decision rules that impose a story of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment (Johnston 1995, 34). Essentially, it all comes down to security. A strategic culture is shaped from a shared sense of self-perception and threat perception of a specific group of people. It is necessary to assume that if a national group has a strong historical sense of war, aggressiveness, victimization, and/or persecution, that these sentiments would play out in their strategic culture, and wou ld limit behavior choice and influence decision-making. erst forged into nation-states these strategic cultures continue to exist, and therefore become intimately indicators of how groups spate warfare and how their states came into being.In order to analyze a nation-states strategic culture properly, it is important to consider that the study of strategic culture itself has cardinal unadorned epistemological approaches context and cognition. Those that believe a strategic culture is based in context would claim that the historical record of the nation, even before its conception as a nation-state, is important to study. Basically, the nation-state expresses its national identity based on its national character. Therefore, a states strategic culture is based on its past it is path dependent.On the other hand, cognitivists see strategic culture as an integrated system of symbols (Johnston 1995, 35). Included in this integrated system of symbols are structures, styles, analog ies, myths, metaphors, etc. In this approach national identity, as related to strategic culture, is more easily discernable through the study of a nation-states wartime symbols than a nation states wartime history. Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle, in their book Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, also argue that symbols (like a flag) can be very telling indicators that lead one to uncover the nature of nationalism that exists within a state. In fall Soldiers, George Mosse looks to nation-states war memorials cemeteries, songs, poems and commemorations, for clues. Essentially, a nations sentiments regarding warfare might differ from its do it they might have been shaped or molded. When trying to find the combine between the birth of a nation-state and warfare, symbols offer yet another variable to consider.Due to the fact that there are two different ways to approach the study of strategic culture, and by association an element of a nation-states national identity, a clear distinction c an be do between proper warfare and traditions of warfare. Traditions, like symbols, need not be based on truth or historical accuracy. There is a tradition of Santa Clause bringing presents to nice children despite there being no assumption of truth behind such a work out and certainly no historical record to legitimize it. Traditions are sometimes developed more because they serve a purpose, than because they truly commemorate something.When considering nation-state formation it is important to properly choose which traditions are worth investigating. Relating to strategic culture, or any issue that shapes a nation-states identity, it is important that a tradition have (i) solid national support, (ii) outlived the era that gave it birth, (iii) entered the persistent lexicon of national discourse, and (iv) continued to run across with a portion of public judgement even at a time when it was not directly affecting public policy (McDougall, Ch.1). As will be shown with the case of Israel, traditions of warfare that have passed the scrutiny of the limitations listed above have played a role in developing national identity, and ultimately forging a nation-state.Modern day Israel is a good example of a nation-state forged on traditions of warfare, and not explicitly in warfare. As suggested above the first place to look for evidence of the link between warfare and state formation would be in a nation-states strategic culture. Israels strategic culture has long been dominated by the realist tradition (Dowty 1998, 84). The realist view of security has solid national support in Israel, it has outlived the era that gave it birth, it has entered the permanent lexicon of national discourse, and even during times of relative peace it continues to come upon with a portion of public opinion. Israels strategic culture is not barely realist with regards to self-defense, but also in its offense.The leftist scholars who would date Zionism to Theodor Herzls avowedly soc ialist ideals of establishing a free, humanitarian and egalitarian state in the Jewish homeland to escape the increasing anti-Semitism of late- 19th century Europe (Avineri, 1981, 88-89) are curt in their efforts. There is no such thing as nineteenth and twentieth century Zionism it is only Zionism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The plain and destructive history of the Jews in Europe plays little significance in Israeli mamlachtiyut, or statism. The traditions that have forged the Israeli nation-state and limit its behavior choices can and should be dated back to the Hebrew Bible. For example, one might choose to examine the myth of the Covenant Nation, and how that played out during the Hebrews first experiment with forging a state following Joshuas invasion of Canaan, as evidence. The invasion represents a realist tradition of conquering and occupying. Whether or not the Hebrew Bible represents an accurate historical rendition or whether it has any academician me rit at all is outside the scope of discussion. After all, when providing an account for Israels strategic culture, the scriptures can be analyzed as being contextually historical or as a symbol of cognition. Either way fact or fiction they provide a tradition from which to get a strategic culture from, and on which to forge a nation-state.Thus, the origin that Richard Bean makes that nation-states developed out of the need for a strong central authority to levy taxes due to changes in the art of war, is unconvincing. To the point of emphasis, most modern economic-dependent nationalist arguments are limited when one considers ancient examples of national groups coming together to forge polities within defined and enunciated borders. Cases such as these simply highlight the fact that the forging of a nation-state draws more on myths, sentiments and symbols of collective fear, threat, pride, angst, aspiration, victimization, xenophobia and so forth when grouping together to organi ze politically. The above sentiments combine to form a strategic culture, from which traditions, national identity and greater cohesiveness are born. The nation-state was born as a response to a need for security the traditions that transmit that feeling be they contextually or cognitively derived are what inevitably forge nation-states and determine how violently they will behave. Though it whitethorn be true that many nation-states are forged explicitly in warfare (and are established using means of warfare), it is not a universal truth. Instead, it should be argued that nation-states are forged on traditions of warfare traditions that once were prescriptive and later become predictive.Covenant NationsAs mentioned above, a strategic culture is shaped from a shared sense of self-perception and threat perception of a specific group of people. It is my assertion (to the contrary of international relations theorists) that Israels strategic culture has nothing to do with threat perc eption geopolitical realities and security dilemmas are but moot points. Israel has pick out and further developed a strategic culture based wholly on a particular tradition of self-perception that of the Covenant Nation.Defining the term Covenant Nation is not as simple as it may appear its definition is hard to come by because it involves describing a process more than an entity. Simply put, the covenant is a tradition of ethnic election. The process of ethnic election is a multi-staged process requiring (i) a sense of being singled out or chosen for a special purpose, (ii) a bode promise whether absolute or conditional made to the chosen people, and (iii) a belief that fulfilment of the covenant leads to worldly salvation (Smith 2003, 48-49). In short, the covenant is a tradition of a contractual agreement between deity and His people. Simply put, the Covenant Nation, therefore, is the nation that enters and embodies the covenant. As stated above, traditions need not be b ased on historical truth or populace in the ethnosymbolic approach traditions, myths and metaphors offer much the same credence to a tip over on nationalism and national identity and thus can serve as an explanation for how nation-states behave.Let me begin by acknowledging that although the term Covenant Nation is rife with religious connotation, I do not intentionally seek to obscure the already blurred lines between religion and nationalism. In fact, I seek to avoid entering the scholarly debate about their ambivalent relationship entirely I steer clear from scholars like Mark Juergensmeyer, whose work albeit fascinating seeks to compare and contrast the two phenomena and chart their historical interplay (Juergensmeyer 2006, 182). Instead, I point to a recent panache in thinking that sees nationalism itself as a form of belief-system or as a new religion of the people (Smith 2003, 42). George Mosse, in Fallen Soldiers Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, discusses how d uring the interwar period in Europe a polite religion of nationalism was born based on the cult of the travel soldier (Mosse 1990, 104). If in Germany, for example, a civic religion of nationalism was born based on the cult of the fallen soldier, it can be said that for Israel a civic religion of nationalism is born based on the cult of the chosen people and the cult of the Promised Land.The Covenant has eternally been the buttocks of Israels national identity dating back to primordial times. The Hebrew Bible first marks the covenant that theology makes with Abram in Genesis 122 I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you. It is important to note that this verse not only represents the birth of the covenant, but at the same time the birth of the nation highlighting their interconnectedness. The nation and the covenant are thus co-determining and mutually implicating the two entities are defined by their internal relationship, such that the two entities derive their meaning through their relationship and have no meaning or basis without the other. No reason is given as to why Abram (later Abraham) is selected to point in time the nation that will come to be known as the chosen people, but we are told that his progeny shall (i) inherit the land of Canaan, and (ii) outnumber the dust of the earth (Gen. 127 and 136) outlining the divine promise.In succumb the covenant nation is obliged to circumcise their children (Gen. 177-10) and post-exodus to keep the laws and commandments that God gives unto his chosen people, the holy nation, at Mount Sinai (Exod. 194-6). Such are the terms of the covenantal contract if the Chosen People follow Yahwehs rules, he will give them virtue, peace and prosperity in the Promised Land. If they are his holy servants, the scriptures say, he will bless them (Akenson 1992, 16). Furthermore, not only do Gods chosen people gather from fulfillment of the covenant the whole world does. By fulfilling the covenant it i s believed that Gods plan of salvation is advanced so to speak, the salvation of all hinges on the preserve of a special few (Smith 2003, 51).Therefore, it is to the conduct of the special few that we now shift our attention. If the renowned modernist scholar on nationalism Elie Kedourie is correct when he asserts that nationalism produces a kind of religious fanaticism that lends to conflict (Kedourie 1971, XX), the same must certainly hold true of covenantal nationalism and likely to an even greater degree. As stated earlier, covenant nations come under a seemingly contractual obligation to defend and secure the idea of (i) a chosen people, in (ii) a Promised Land, using (iii) regular blood sacrifice. Furthermore, the fulfillment of the covenant sets the chosen people apart from other peoples both ethically and ritually Ye shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy (Lev. 192). If fulfillment of the covenant that is following the laws and commandments within the Promised Land makes one holy and will lead to worldly salvation for all, than any/all efforts to attain that credo become morally indisputable. A holier-than-thou and realist strategic culture develops whereby any actions taken in fulfillment of the covenant become necessary, justified and self-vindicating.The strategic culture associated with the covenant has thus permeated passim time in much the same way it was born manifested from a belief in choseness, holiness, and obligation. The Jewish nation has always found its foundation in the covenant whether in the times of Elijah or Hezekiah, Josiah or Nehemiah, the Maccabees or the Talmudic Sages all of these looked back to the founding charter of the covenant, not just as legitimation but as the grounding for their conception of the community of Israel and the unity of the Jewish people, which they seek to restore or deepen (Smith 2003, 63).It is on this sacred foundation that modern day Israel was also established. Nineteenth century poli tical Zionism can be broken down into three competing schools of thought (i) the Revisionist Zionists, (ii) the get Zionists, and (iii) the spectral Zionists. In many ways revisionist Zionism epitomizes what it means to be a covenant nation. Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky, the go bad of revisionist Zionism, believed that people are naturally born into nations and inherit its cultures and values. So to speak, individuals have very little choice regarding which nationalities they belong to. It was Jabotinskys belief that the Jews represent a particularly strong nation because despite the pressures of the Diaspora they always maintained their originality and distinctness(Dowty, 37). Furthermore, he insisted that the Jewish state be established in Palestine and trans-Jordan because it was the historical legacy of the Jews.On the other hand, Labor Zionism the most influential branch of Zionism at the time considered itself to be totally worldly in nature. Aaron David Gordon, founder of Hapoel Hatzair, saw the Jewish life in the Diaspora as dependence and a lack of self-reliance. Building on German-Jewish philosopher Martin Bubers I and Thou, he sought to create a new covenant by reconnecting with the land using the religion of labor (Dowty, 39), and by replacing the old exiled Jew with a new self-reliant Jew. However, under the secular garb of Labor Zionism the language and intent of the original Abrahamic Covenant can be discerned (Smith 2003, 93). Ber Borochov, ideological founder of the Poalei Zion labor movement wrote that class struggles exist within national groups as well as between them, clearly acknowledging a difference between the Jewish nation and other peoples, and advocating an ethnic nationalism, rather than the more render and tolerant civic kind (Howe 2000, 236). For reasons such as this he sought to establish a Jewish socialist state. It is important to note, however, that not any state would do for Labor Zionists the state was to be establish ed in the Jewish homeland. To the point of emphasis, upon establishment of the state of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, the first Labor blossom Minister of Israel declared the uniqueness of the Hebrew people and the redemptive destiny of Israel on its own soil (Smith 2003, 92-93). In so doing he admit Labor and Religious Zionism to be not only compatible, but complimentary.Religious Zionism was headed by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook. While it is the usual view that Zionism is a sin and alien culture, a non-Jewish way of life, and that Jews should only return to the Promised Land after messianic repurchase, Kook claimed that enhancing attachment to the land is an obligation (Dowty, 44). Essentially, Kook is advocating preparing the land for redemption and salvation and suggests that the secular Zionists are doing holy work by settling the Promised Land.Clearly in all three branches of Zionism the tradition of the covenant the Great Compromiser critical the four deep seated cultural resourc es that define the covenant nation, namely community, territory, history and destiny, permeate all of their raisons dtre. By 1948, the underlying dimensions of the covenant nation return to fruition and again form a unifying and legitimizing tradition like in times past. From this tradition a realist strategic culture was born that has (i) solid national support, (ii) outlived the era that gave it birth, (iii) entered the permanent lexicon of national discourse, and (iv) continued to resonate with a portion of public opinion even during times of relative peace. Biblically, historically and contemporarily time and again the covenant h